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Abstract
This paper analyses the incentives of the equityholders of a leveraged company
to shut it down in a continuous time, stochastic environment. Keeping the rm
as an ongoing concern has an option value but equity and debt holders value it
dierently. Equityholders' decisions exhibit excessive continuation and reduce rm's
value. Using a compound exchange option approach, we characterise the resulting
agency costs of debt, derive the \price" of these costs and analyse their dynamics.
We also show how agency costs can be reduced by the design of debt and the
possibility of renegotiation.
Jel Classication: G30, G13, L10.
1 Introduction
This paper aims at integrating the study of dynamic agency costs in an option pricing mod-
el. The objectives are, on the one hand to derive new theoretical insights on the dynamics
of agency relationships -most of the corporate nance literature concerned with incentive
problems remains static- and, on the other hand, to characterise the consequences of these
conicts on the pricing of nancial securities -most of the pricing literature supposes the
Modigliani-Miller dichotomy between real and nancial decisions.
We limit ourselves to a particular sort of agency conict: the reluctance of equityhold-
ers to shut down the activities of a leveraged company. The shareholders of an indebted
rm may keep the company as an ongoing concern in the hope that its situation may
improve, even though shutting down the rm is more valuable in expected terms. The
possibility of excessive continuation stems from the conict of interest existing between
equityholders and debtholders: limited liability shifts the cost of losses to the latter and
allows equityholders to benet from signicant upturns. Our focus is motivated by em-
pirical considerations
1
, by the important static corporate nance literature devoted to it
(starting with Jensen and Meckling (1976)) and also by the extent to which the problem
naturally ts an option framework. In fact, our work can also be viewed as an attempt
to blend a model of nancial option with a real option problem.
It is worth emphasizing that we do not attempt at deriving an optimal capital struc-
ture: we only focus on a cost of debt. One could introduce other elements justifying that
debt nancing may be desirable in the rst place but our objective is to derive a lower
bound for any possible expected benet of debt to make this form of nancing desirable.
Our model is designed to be the simplest one capturing the possibility of excessive con-
tinuation, in a continuous time environment. The analysis requires the use of a compound
exchange option methodology. The results are obtained by extending the variational ap-
1
The relevance of excessive continuation problems, which can be viewed as a consequence of the asset
substitution eect and can sometimes take the more radical form of a \gamble for resurrection" when the
rm is in nancial distress, is supported by many stylised facts (see for instance Grinblatt and Titman
(1998)). However, to the best of our knowledge there is no econometric study specically devoted to this
problem.
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proach to option pricing developed by Decamps and Rochet (1997) to this setting.
With respect to our \pricing" objective, we characterise the agency costs associated
with any possible capital structures. We derive a closed-form formula for the magnitude
of these costs in the case of straight debt. We also perform some comparative static
exercises and we show the value of the rm monotonically decreases with total leverage.
Regarding the insights on the dynamics of agency costs, we derive a condition ensuring
that the closer the rm gets to the debt maturity, the higher the agency costs. These costs
can nonetheless be reduced by a dynamic renegotiation process and we characterise the
optimal sequence of renegotiation oers in an ideal world where renegotiation between
equity and debt holders is frictionless. We also investigate the optimal allocation of
coupons. Keeping total leverage constant, the allocation of coupons modies the value
of the rm because these coupons aect the \risk of a gamble". We show that issuing
coupon debt dominates zero coupon debt, keeping total leverage constant.
The relation to the literature is discussed once the model is introduced which is the
object of section 2. Section 3 is devoted to the case of zero coupon debt nancing while
section 4 shows how the agency costs of debt nancing can be reduced by renegotiation
and coupon design. Finally, a short section concludes.
2 The General Framework
2.1 A Simple Model of the Firm.
We start by presenting a very stylised model of the rm. A rm is characterised by the
existence at an initial date (hereafter date 0) of both an entrepreneur and a project. This
project necessitates some initial investment -S
0
denotes its cost-, and has a nite maturity
T . Namely, we will assume that if completed, the project will generate some stochastic
cash ows at a date T . V (T ) denotes the value of these cash ows at date T . In a risk
neutral world, V (t) will then represent the discounted expectation of these nal returns,
at date t. For simplifying the terminology, we will refer to V (t) as the current value of the
rm's assets. One can interpreted it as the value of these assets when the entrepreneur
2
uses them to produce some goods and services which are then sold in the product market.
The managers of the rm have the option to shut it down before nal completion of the
project. This decision is irreversible: once the company is shut down, its activity cannot
be restarted. If so, the dierent claimholders have to share the residual value (we will also
call it the \scrap value") of the physical assets. If they decide to abandon the productive
activity of the rm at date t
i
, they receive an amount of cash S(t
i
) at that date. This
residual value may dier from the current value (which again is the expected value of
the cash ows at the terminal date) for several reasons. For instance, S represents the
resale value of the assets in the second-hand market while V is the expected prot that
these assets, in conjunction with the human capital of the managers/equityholders, can
generate. The presence of some specic human capital may explain why the resale price
of the physical assets is less than V . The dierence can also come from a reputation eect
(negative or positive) embodied in the current value of a company but not in the value of
its physical assets. This may include as well a factor reecting the competitive position
of the company. More generally, the dierence V  S will represent any sort of intangible
asset
2
likely to aect the protability of the company. To put it dierently, assuming
there were a market for these intangible assets, their price plus the cost of acquiring the
physical assets will be equal, in equilibrium, to the current value of the rm V . Whenever
these intangible assets have a positive value, V will be higher than S but we may as
well consider the case where this dierence is negative (rms with a bad reputation for
instance, or in a poor competitive position). In general, the empirical fact that Tobin's
Qs tend to dier from one provides some support to our assumption that V   S 6= 0.
Given our single project rm, the value of the company will be determined by the
expected value of the future cash-ows -should the project be completed-, the residual
value of the assets -if not- and the possibility to shut down the rm. Consequently,
characterising the exercise policy of such a real option will be central to our analysis.
It is important to emphasis that this shut down decision is not independent of the
2
This interpretation also supports our assumption that a shut down is irreversible: even if the physical
assets can be bought in the market, reputation or market position are idiosyncratic to rms. One cannot
easily buy these characteristics which needs to be developed over time.
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rm's capital structure. Our focus is on the (dynamic) agency conicts that may arise
between equityholders and debtholders. Indeed, the parties entitled to the control rights
will exercise these rights in a way which maximises the value of their income rights. In
our model, the shut down decision will not be mechanically determined by a bankruptcy
rule. Bankruptcy may be declared when a debt repayment cannot be met and default can
trigger a change of control: debtholders will now be entitled to exercise the shut down
option but, a priori, they may be willing to continue the rm's activity if such a strategy
increases their payos
3
. It is also important to distinguish this decision from a pure
liquidation process. In both cases, the activity is stopped and the rm leaves the output
market. But the stopping decision refers to the decision taken by the agents in control
of the rm (whoever they are), potentially independently of any state of default. For
instance, an unlevered rm cannot be liquidated even though its activity will be stopped
when such a strategy maximises the wealth of its equityholders.
Before characterising the dierent (endogenous) exercise policies of this real option,
we need to specify the stochastic structure of our model. We consider a continuous time
economy where time t belongs to a bounded interval [0; T ]. Capital markets are frictionless
and free of informational asymetries. The agents are risk neutral
4
and can borrow and lend
freely at a constant riskless interest rate r. Uncertainty is dened by a probability space
(
;F ; Q). The ow of information accruing to the agents is represented by the continuous
ltration (F
t
)
t2[0;T ]
associated to a two dimensional Q Brownian motion (W
1
;W
2
). F
0
is
trivial and F
T
is equal to F .
The productive value V and the scrap value S of the rm's assets are assumed to obey
the lognormal diusion processes:
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
dV
V
= rdt+ 
V
dW
1
(t)
V
0
> 0
(1)
3
Continuation under debtholders' control can refer to a form of reorganisation made possible by the
bankruptcy code, like for instance as it is the case in the US with Chapters 7 and 11.
4
The risk neutrality assumption represents little loss of generality. If agents were risk averse, the
analysis could be conducted using risk neutral probabilities rather than actual probabilities (see Harrison
and Kreps (1979)).
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>
>
<
>
>
>
:
dS
S
= Ædt+ 
S
dW
2
(t)
S
0
> 0
(2)
where Æ is a real constant, the volatilities 
V
and 
S
are positive constants. V
0
is the
initial productive value of the rm's assets, S
0
is the initial scrap value of the rm's assets
(which is also the investment cost). The two standard Brownian motions W
1
and W
2
are
assumed to be correlated. Typically, one may suspect a positive correlation, reecting
that the residual value of an asset is likely to be higher when the productive value is itself
higher.
We suppose the current value of the rm's assets V is a traded asset
5
. Under the risk
neutrality assumption the instantaneous rate in equation (1) is thus equal to the riskless
interest rate r. In contrast, we consider that the scrap value of the physical asset is not a
traded asset, (as a consequence, the instantaneous rate of return Æ in equation (2) can be
dierent from r). Our justication is that, as long as the rm is in activity, this residual
value does not correspond to any real process. It is only once the shut down decision has
been taken that an amount of cash S is available to claimholders. The dynamics of this
cash-ow are given by equation (2).
In order to use the option pricing methodology, we classically assume that stochastic
changes in S are spanned with existing assets. In other words, markets are suÆciently
complete and it is possible to nd an asset or to construct a dynamic portfolio of assets
the price of which is perfectly correlated with S.
Finally, we assume that the scrapping decision can be taken at a nite number of
dates, 0 < t
1
< t
2
< ::: < t
n
< T
6
. This modelling can be motivated by the remark that
the shut down decision can only be taken during a meeting of the board of directors or
necessitates some form of communication between leading shareholders and management.
These communications can only happen at xed time intervals. We nevertheless also
investigate in the sequel the case where the shut down decision is made in continuous
5
The results we derive thereafter can also be obtained without making this standard assumption.
Ericsson and Reneby (1997) proposes a detailed discussion of the dierent assumptions about the trading
of assets and rm's values.
6
The case t
n
= T will also be discussed. t
n
< T introduces a second element of irreversibility in the
continuation decision: after date t
n
, the shut down option is denitely lost.
5
time.
2.2 Relation with the Literature.
Since the pioneering work of Mello and Parsons (1992), some recent articles have incor-
porated agency problems into an option pricing framework.
Ericsson (1997) and Leland (1998) investigate the asset substitution problem where
a rm can modify the volatility of its value.
7
Considering a leveraged company, these
authors compare the choice of two possible levels for the volatility parameter of the rm
and show that the one which is optimal ex ante is usually not the one chosen after debt
has been issued. Two theoretical problems limit their analysis. First, one should explain
why the volatility parameter choice is restricted to a particular subset of values. Indeed,
without such a restriction, equityholders will benet from innite volatility choices as
their claim is a convex function of the underlying asset
8
. Second, the welfare eÆciency of
the policy chosen should be assessed against a benchmark case. The standard benchmark
is typically dened by the policy maximising the value of an unlevered rm. In these
articles, the value of an unlevered rm at the initial date is independent of the volatility
choice: from a normative point of view, one cannot say that a particular volatility level
is more eÆcient than another one.
Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) characterise the consequences of the capital struc-
ture on an abandonment decision. They exhibit an underinvestment (too much aban-
donment) result. This comes from the fact that equityholders have to inject new cash in
the rm to keep it as an ongoing concern. To some extent, their continuation decision
can be reinterpreted as an investment decision. Similarly, Mauer and Ott (1998) consid-
er the investment in a growth option by equityholders of a leveraged company and also
exhibit an underinvestment result for exactly the same reason. These papers thus oer
a continuous time version of the sort of problems rst examined in Myers (1977): the
7
Leland (1994) and Leland and Toft (1996) also touch on asset substitution, but are mainly concerned
with the optimal capital structure which balances the tax benets and the bankruptcy costs coming with
debt.
8
This is still true for a large range of parameter values even if bankruptcy costs are introduced as in
Leland (1998).
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injection of new cash by equityholders has a positive externality on debtholders' claims
and the continuation (or expansion) decision is less than optimal because equityholders
do not internalise this eect. Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) and Mella-Barral (1999)
more specically study the renegotiation game which may result between equityholders
and debtholders and also allow for the possibility of strategic default.
We study here the complementary case where continuing the current activity does not
require new funds but, along the lines of the literature pioneered by Jensen and Meck-
ling (1976), where risk taking behaviour is the crucial ingredient of the agency conict.
Keeping the rm alive is a risky strategy while stopping it yields, at that date, a certain
amount of cash to the dierent claimholders. From an empirical point of view, excessive
continuation problems are well documented even in their extreme form of the \gamble for
resurrection", from the evidence concerning the banking industry
9
to some high prole
bankruptcy cases
10
. Parrino and Weisbach (1999) also provide some simulations show-
ing that the gamble for resurrection is likely to be much more of a problem in realistic
industry conditions. The static corporate nance literature has also extensively consid-
ered excessive continuation problems, either motivated by risk-loving attitudes or by the
existence of private benets of control
11
.
Our paper is also related to the real option literature
12
as the possibility to scrap down
the rm is a real option whose value has been characterised for instance by McDonald and
Siegel (1985) or Dixit and Pyndick (1994) in the context of an all-equity rm (nancial
decisions are not considered). In our setting, with discrete scrapping dates, compound
exchange options play a crucial role. MacDonald and Siegel (1985) derive the analogue of
the Margrabe (1978)'s formula for exchange options in the case of non traded assets. Using
9
One should of course take into account the role played by the deposit insurance systems in this case.
Notice however that the consequences of such a system with respect to our problem are essentially to
shift the cost of excessive risk taking from depositors to the insurance system. One may argue that
the insurance system exacerbates the gambling problem as rational depositors would anticipate banks'
behaviour and charge a risk premium. Nonetheless, removing the deposit insurance system would not
eliminate the gambling problem: banks would like to commit ex ante to adopt safer strategies but ex
post (once they have obtained the funds), their incentives to take on risks are exactly the same as with
deposit insurance.
10
See Grinblatt and Titman (1998) for some detailed examples.
11
see the survey by Harris and Raviv (1991).
12
For a survey of this literature, see for instance Sick (1995).
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standard arbitrage derivations, Carr (1988) obtains the price of a compound exchange
option and discusses the application of his formula to investment decision problem. Using
the variational approach developed by Decamps and Rochet (1997), we revisit Carr's
(1988) formula: The compound exchange option price is now obtained as the value of
an optimization problem. This allows us in particular to propose in section 3 a generic
formula for the magnitude of the agency costs. This formula is written as the dierence
between two identical compound exchange options with dierent exercise policies.
Finally, to the best of our knowledge, our paper also diers from the rest of the liter-
ature by not assuming some form of stationarity. Most of the aforementioned papers in
continuous time consider perpetual coupon debt
13
. By construction, these papers cannot
address the questions of the dynamics of agency costs, of the allocation of coupons over
time and of the evolution of renegotiation oers as the rm gets closer to the maturity.
Although agency problems are by now well understood in various static environments, not
much work has been done for analysing their dynamics. Our work aims to be a step in
this direction and we try to develop a dynamic model as close as possible to the existing
analysis of, for instance, Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) or Hart and Moore (1989, 1994,
1996). A dynamic extension of these models requires a non stationary environment. The
paper closest to ours from this literature is Hart and Moore (1994). Our paper is dierent
and complementary to theirs. In a deterministic environment, they focus on the bargain-
ing game between an entrepreneur who has borrowed some funds and an external creditor,
given that the entrepreneur can strategically run away from the company. The value of
the company is supposed to dier whether the entrepreneur or the creditor is managing
it. Hart and Moore (1994) are concerned with the optimal allocation of residual rights of
control and characterize how debt can implement the optimal mechanism. We simplify,
and most of the time ignore, the renegotiation game and the optimal allocation of control
by assuming that there is no intermediate cash ows if the rm is kept as an ongoing
concern (however, we will characterize how coupon debt can transfer decision rights in
the debtholders hands and the resulting consequences on the continuation decisions). We
are essentially concerned with how the split of income rights induced by debt in a dynamic
13
A noticeable exception is Leland and Toft (1996) which considers a nite maturity debt but this debt
is rolled over continously.
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and stochastic environment leads equity and debt holders to value dierently the option
of not liquidating the rm. The agency conict comes from this dierence and is not
assumed to exist in the rst place because of some intrinsic dierences between what the
entrepreneur and the creditor can do. Although we do not derive the optimal nancial
contract and take debt as given, our framework also allows us to consider some problem-
s related to its design, to the allocation of coupons over time and to the possibility of
renegotiation at dierent dates. Even in the absence of stationarity, we will obtain quasi
closed form solutions for the rm's value and the agency costs of debt in the various cases.
2.3 Preliminary Analysis: a Compound Exchange Approach
This paragraph presents some technical results which will prove useful in the sequel. They
extend the variational approach developed by Decamps and Rochet (1997) to the context
of compound exchange options.
Let X(t) denote the price at date t of a traded asset
14
. Let C
n
(X(t); S(t); t) denote
the price at date t, (t < t
1
< ::: < t
n
), of the compound exchange option which gives
the right to exchange at date t
n
the scrap value of the rm's assets S(t
n
) for X(t
n
) and
to exchange at dates t
n i
(1  i  n   1),
~
S(t
n i
) = (1   e
 (r Æ)(t
n i+1
 t
n i
)
)S(t
n i
)
for C
i
(X(t
n i
); S(t
n i
); t
n i
) where C
1
(X(t
n 1
); S(t
n 1
); t
n 1
) denotes the value at date
t
n 1
of the option to exchange at date t
n
S(t
n
) for X(t
n
). The subscript i under C
refers to the fact, that, at date t
n i
, there are i future exercise dates pending. Let

n
(X(t); S(t); t;A
1
;A
2
;    ;A
n
) denote the price at date t for an arbitrary exercise policy
A
1
;A
2
;    ;A
n
of the compound option described previously. Under these notations the
following holds.
14
As it will be clear, the traded assets X which naturally appear in our analysis are (i) the traded
asset associated to the productive value of the rm (whose price at t is V (t)), (ii) the portfolio composed
of the traded asset associated to the productive value of the rm and of the put option written on this
asset with exercise price the face value of the debt M and exercise date the expiring date of the debt
T (whose price at date t is V (t) + P (V (t);M; T   t)). Hence, in the sequel X(t) will be either V (t) ot
V (t) + P (V (t);M; T   t)
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Lemma 1

n
(X(t); S(t); t;A
1
;    ;A
n
) = IE
t
[e
 r(t
n
 t)
(X(t
n
)  S(t
n
))1I
A
1
\\A
n
]
 
n 1
X
i=1
IE
t
[e
 r(t
i
 t)
~
S(t
i
)1I
A
1
\\A
i
]:
Proof: By induction on n. For n = 1 the formula is tautological. Suppose it is true for
n  1, for t < t
1
we have

n
(X(t); S(t); t;A
1
;    ;A
n
) = IE
t
[e
 r(t
1
 t)
(
n 1
(X(t
1
); S(t
1
); t
1
) 
~
S(t
1
))1I
A
1
]
= IE
t
[e
 r(t
1
 t)
fIE
t
1
[e
 r(t
n
 t
1
)
(X(t
n
)  S(t
n
))1I
A
2
\\A
n
 
n 1
X
i=2
e
 r(t
i
 t
1
)
~
S(t
i
)1I
A
2
\\A
n
]1I
A
1
g]
 IE
t
[e
 r(t
1
 t)
~
S(t
1
)1I
A
1
]
= IE
t
[e
 r(t
n
 t)
(X(t
n
)  S(t
n
))1I
A
1
\\A
n
] 
n 1
X
i=1
IE
t
[
 r(t
i
 t)
~
S(t
i
)1I
A
1
\\A
i
]:
Lemma 2
C
n
(X(t); S(t); t) = max
A
1
2F
t
1
.
.
.
A
n
2F
t
n
(X(t); S(t); t;A
1
;A
2
;    ;A
n
):
Proof: By induction on n. For n = 1, consider 0  t  t
1
, we have
C
1
(X(t); S(t); t) = IE
t
[e
 r(t
1
 t)
(X(t
1
)  S(t
1
))
+
]
= max
A
1
2F
t
1
IE
t
[e
 r(t
1
 t)
(X(t
1
)  S(t
1
))1I
A
1
]
= max
A
1
2F
t
1

1
(X(t); S(t); t):
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Suppose now the property true for n  1 then
C
n
(X(t); S(t); t) = IE
t
[e
 r(t
1
 t)
(C
n 1
(X(t
1
); S(t
1
); t
1
) 
~
S(t
1
))
+
]
= max
A
1
2F
t
1
IE
t
[e
 r(t
1
 t)
(C
n 1
(X(t
1
); S(t
1
); t
1
) 
~
S(t
1
))1I
A
1
]
= max
A
1
2F
t
1
IE
t
[e
 r(t
1
 t)
( max
A
2
2F
t
2
.
.
.
A
n
2F
t
n

n 1
(X(t
1
); S(t
1
); t
1
;A
2
;    ;A
n
) 
~
S(t
1
))1I
A
1
]
= max
A
1
2F
t
1
A
2
2F
t
2
.
.
.
A
n
2F
t
n
IE
t
[e
 r(t
1
 t)
(
n 1
(X(t
1
); S(t
1
); t
1
;A
2
;    ;A
n
) 
~
S(t
1
))1I
A
1
]
= max
A
1
2F
t
1
.
.
.
A
n
2F
t
n

n
(X(t); S(t); t;A
1
;    ;A
n
):
Remark that the optimal exercise policies at date t
n
; t
n 1
;    ; t
1
are dened by the
sets
fX(t
n
)  S(t
n
)g and for all 1  i  n  1 fC
i
(X(t
n i
); S(t
n i
); t
n i
) 
~
S(t
n i
)g:
Lemma 3
81  i  n  1 C
i
(X(t
n i
); S(t
n i
); t
n i
))  X(t
n i
)  e
 (r Æ)(t
n i+1
 t
n i
)
S(t
n i
):
Proof:
Consider A
1
= A
2
=    = A
n
= 
 and apply Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
3 Capital Structure and Exercise Policies of a Mul-
tidate Scrapping Option.
We make the assumption throughout the analysis that there is no conict of interest
between the managers of the company and itsequityholders. Consequently, managers
always choose the policy maximising the value of equuityholders' claims. As a proper
benchmark case, we start by characterising the optimal scrapping policy of an unlevered
company. We will then move to the case of a levered company.
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3.1 The rst best rule
Let us denote by v
n
(V (t); S(t); t;A
1
;A
2
;    ;A
n
) the value at date t < t
1
of the rm if
the equityholders choose at dates t
1
<    < t
n
, the continuation policy A
1
;A
2
;    ;A
n
.
The subscript n under v refers to the fact, that, at date t, there are n operating decisions
to be taken by equityholders. Using the previous lemmata, we prove:
Proposition 1 The value at date 0, v

(0), of the all equity benchmark rm is given by
the relation
v

(0) = max
A
1
2F
t
1
.
.
.
A
n
2F
t
n
v
n
(V (0); S(0); 0;A
1
;A
2
;    ;A
n
)
= S
0
e
 (r Æ)t
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The optimal continuation policy is dened by the relations:
A

n
= fV (t
n
)  S(t
n
)g and
8 i; 1  i  n  i; A

n i
= fC
i
(V (t
n i
); S(t
n i
); t
n i
)) 
~
S(t
n i
)g:
Proof: see appendix.
The policy maximising the value of the rm can easily be understood when adopting a
backward reasoning. At the last possible scrapping date t
n
, the optimal decision is clearly
to scrap the company if and only if S(t
n
)  V (t
n
). However, this simple comparison
is only optimal at the last date. For any date t
n i
, deciding to stop whenever S(t
n i
)
exceeds V (t
n i
) is suboptimal as this rule ignores the option value of continuation. To
illustrate this point, consider the decision to be taken at date t
n 1
. Two eects govern the
scrapping decision at that date. To disentangle these eects, consider the hypothetical
scenario where the equityholders are sure that a shut down decision will be taken at date
t
n
, should this date be reached. If instead closure occurs at date t
n 1
, equityholders
obtain S(t
n 1
) that they compare (in this scenario) with the discounted expected value
of S(t
n
), i.e. S(t
n 1
)e
 (r Æ)(t
n
 t
n 1
)
. Conditionally on scrapping tomorrow, equityholders
should scrap the rm immediately if S(t
n 1
)  S(t
n 1
)e
 (r Æ)(t
n
 t
n 1
)
. Therefore,
~
S(t
n 1
)
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represents the net gain of scrapping the rm now where net means in comparison with
the payo obtained by scrapping the rm at the next possible date. Notice that whenever
r  Æ this net eect is negative and scrapping should not occur until possibly the last
scrapping date t
n
. There is a second eect due to the fact that the rm may not be
scrapped at the next date: equityholders could choose to get V (t
n
) instead of S(t
n
). Given
that C
1
(V (t
n 1
); S(t
n 1
); t
n 1
) denotes the value at date t
n 1
of the option to exchange
at date t
n
, S(t
n
) for V (t
n
), equityholders of an unlevered rm should denitely decide
to continue at date t
n 1
if C
1
(V (t
n 1
); S(t
n 1
); t
n 1
) 
~
S(t
n 1
). To summarize, keeping
the rm alive gives a) the possibility to scrap it latter as opposed to now and b) the
(exchange) option to keep it alive latter as opposed to closing it latter.
The same two eects can be distinguished when moving to date t
n 2
. The sec-
ond eect is modied though, as continuing gives the option to exchange S(t
n 1
) for
C
1
(V (t
n 1
); S(t
n 1
); t
n 1
) at the next date, that is to say at t
n 1
. The value of such an
option is C
2
(V (t
n 2
); S(t
n 2
); t
n 2
) and our formula obtains. Similar arguments apply for
dates t
n i
.
This proposition allows us to derive a simple characterisation of the agency costs
associated with any possible continuation policy.
Corollary 1 Assume that the choice of the equityholders for a given nancial structure
is characterized by the continuation policy A
1
;    ;A
n
. (A
i
2 F
t
i
). Then, such a nancial
structure induces some positive agency costs

n
(0) = C
n
(V (0); S(0); 0)  
n
(V (0); S(0); 0;A
1
;A
2
;    ;A
n
)  0:
Indeed, as the variational approach shows that C
n
(V (0); S(0); 0) is a maximum, agency
costs are necessarily non negative. We now have to endogenise these exercise policies
A
1
;    ;A
n
as a function of the existing capital structure.
3.2 The Agency Costs of a Zero Coupon Debt.
This section studies the case of a levered rm nanced with a zero coupon debt. Again,
our objective is to characterise the agency costs associated with such a nancial structure
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and we deliberately ignore the question of the optimality of this capital structure: given
that we only focus on a cost of debt, the optimal amount of debt in our model will
tautologically be zero. Our objective is to be able to derive an order of magnitude for
this cost of debt which could then be compared with some possible benets of debt.
For instance, one can show that introducing some tax shields would make some strictly
positive debt levels desirable.
Assume the rm is nanced with a zero-coupon bond maturing at date T with face
valueM . We suppose that if the rm is scrapped then the debt becomes immediately due
(with the face value being correspondly discounted) or, equivalently that the proceeds of
the residual value are invested in the riskless asset until date T is reached. The only thing
we rule out here is the possibility that equityholders could scrap the rm and run away
with the residual value. This is in the spirit of the analysis rst developed by Hart and
Moore (1989) where the liquidation proceeds cannot be diverted by entrepreneurs.
The value of equity satises:
Lemma 4
(i) At date t
n
, conditionally on the rm still being operated as an ongoing concern at
that date, the value of the equity is C(V (t
n
);M; T   t
n
).
(ii) For all 1  i  n   1, conditionally on the rm still being operated as an ongoing
concern at date t
n i
, the value of the equities is
C
i

V (t
n i
)+P (V (t
n i
);M; T t
n i
); S(t
n i
); t
n i

+e
 (r Æ)(t
n i+1
 t
n i
)
S(t
n i
) Me
 r(T t
n i
)
:
Proof: see appendix
The rst part of this lemma simply restates the well-known result that, without any
operating decision considerations (after date t
n
there is no pending scrapping dates), the
value of equity in a levered rm is the value of a call option on the rm with an exercise
price equal to the debt obligation. At an earlier date, equityholders also have the option
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to scrap the company before date T . Our expression obtains by rearranging terms and
using the put-call parity formula. The intuition can be illustrated in the example of a
2 scrapping dates model: t
1
and t
2
. The value of equity at date t
2
(the last scrapping
date) conditionally on continuing at date t
2
is simply C(V (t
2
);M; T   t
2
). Notice that
equityholders will continue at date t
2
if C(V (t
2
);M; T   t
2
)  (S(t
2
) Me
 r(T t
2
)
)
+
and
in particular, continuation will always takes place whenever S(t
2
)  Me
 r(T t
2
)
as the
value of a call is positive. The value of equity at date t
1
conditionally on continuing at
date t
1
is:
IE
t
1

e
 r(t
2
 t
1
)


C(V (t
2
);M; T   t
2
)  S(t
2
) +Me
 r(T t
2
)

+
+ S(t
2
) Me
 r(T t
2
)

which rewrites as (using the put-call parity formula):
C (P (V (t
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1
) + V (t
1
); S(t
1
); t
1
) + IE
t
1
h
e
 r(t
2
 t
1
)

S(t
2
) Me
 r(T t
2
)
i
the formula given in the lemma. If they continue at date t
1
, equityholders know that
they will get at least S(t
2
)  Me
 r(T t
2
)
. Indeed, if this is negative they will not scrap
at date t
2
and wait for V (T ) to realise as things can only get better from their point
of view. If this expression is positive, they can always obtain this payo by scrapping
at date t
2
. But they can sometimes do better by exchanging S(t
2
) Me
 r(T t
2
)
against
IE
t
2
[(V (T )  M)
+
]. Hence, the value of equity if there is no scrapping at date t
1
is the
expected value of S(t
2
) Me
 r(T t
2
)
plus the expected value of the exchange option which
allows equityholders to swap S(t
2
)  Me
 r(T t
2
)
for IE
t
2
[(V (T )  M)
+
] at date t
2
. The
rst term of the formula represents the value of this exchange option.
>From this lemma and the assumption that the management team chooses the oper-
ating policy maximising the equity value, we are now in position to prove:
Proposition 2
(i) Assume the rm is nanced with a zero-coupon bond maturing at date T with face
value M , then the value of the rm at date 0 is dened by the relation
v
n
(V (0); S(0); 0; E
1
;    ; E
n
) = S
0
e
 (r Æ)t
1
+ 
n
(V (0); S(0); 0; E
1
;    ; E
n
)
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where
E
n
= fP (V (t
n
);M; T   t
n
) + V (t
n
)  S(t
n
)g
and 81  i  n  i
E
n i
= fC
i
(V (t
n i
) + P (V (t
n i
);M; T   t
n i
); S(t
n i)
); t
n i
) 
~
S(t
n i
)g:
(ii) At each date t
n i
, (for all 0  i  n   1), equityholders \too often continue" the
activity of the rm with respect to the rst best rule.
Proof: see appendix.
Some comments are in order to illustrate the operating decisions of the equityholders
of a levered company. At the last scrapping date, equityholders simply compare the
value of their claim when the rm is closed, (S(t
n
) Me
 r(T t
n
)
)
+
, with the value under
continuation. The value under continuation is the value of a call option on V with an
exercise price of M , as in Merton (1974). The expression for E
n
comes from the put-call
parity formula. Notice again that if the scrap value is insuÆcient to meet the discounted
debt obligation, (S(t
n
)  Me
 r(T t
n
)
), then necessarily equityholders will prefer to keep
the option alive and therefore continue the rm's activities. The exercise policy of the
equityholders of a levered rm at date n   1 can be understood with the same sort of
thought experiment than the one we did in the unlevered case. Suppose that equityholders
were sure to scrap the rm at date t
n
. Under this assumption, their expected payo if
they continue at date t
n 1
is IE
t
n 1
[(S(t
n
)  Me
 r(T t
n
)
)
+
]. From our previous remark,
this scenario is only possible under the hypothesis that equityholders consider as certain
that S(t
n
)  Me
 r(T t
n
)
, otherwise closure will not occur at date t
n
. If they think so,
should they close the rm right now instead of waiting until the next possible date?
In a fashion similar to what happened for the all-equity rm, the net gain of an earlier
closure relative to a shut down at the next date remains equal to
~
S(t
n 1
). This is again the
dierence between S(t
n 1
) Me
 r(T t
n 1
)
and the discounted value of S(t
n
) Me
 r(T t
n
)
,
i.e. S(t
n 1
)e
 (r Æ)(t
n
 t
n 1
)
 Me
 r(T t
n 1
)
. Indeed, the present value of the debt obligation
is invariant to the date at which debt is repaid as it is simply the face value discounted at a
rate r. The second eect governing the scrapping decision is dierent from the one in the
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rst best case because now the equityholders' option is not to exchange S(t
n
) for V (t
n
)
but (S(t
n
) Me
 r(T t
n
)
)
+
for IE
t
n
[(V (T ) M)
+
]. For instance, using the illustration of
Lemma 4 of a two scrapping dates case, equityholders continue at date t
1
if the expected
value of S(t
2
) Me
 r(T t
2
)
plus the expected value of the exchange option which allows
equityholders to swap S(t
2
) Me
 r(T t
2
)
to IE
t
2
[(V (T ) M)
+
] exceeds S(t
1
) Me
 r(T t
1
)
.
Rearranging terms, using the denition of C
i
and the put-call parity formula, we obtain
E
2
. Same arguments can be used to illustrate the derivation of E
n i
.
How do these operating decisions compare with the rst best policy? At the last
scrapping date t
n
, the excessive risk taking behaviour of equityholders is easy to charac-
terise. In particular, as we have already mentioned, they will continue when the scrap
value is less than the present value of debt, regardless of the dierence V   S: in such
a case, stopping will force them to default while continuing keeps alive the chance that
they will be able to repay their debt and collect whatever is left. This is a very ineÆcient
decision rule if at the same time the current value V (t
n
) is much smaller than the residual
value. Such a case corresponds to an extreme form of gamble for resurrection. In fact, this
form of gamble will occur at any date t
n i
when S(t
n i
)  Me
 r(T t
n
i
) 15
. But even in
the alternative case, equityholders' behaviour will exhibit excessive continuation (at least
weakly) compared to the rst best policy, at every date t
n i
. In addition to the eect on
the rm's value, the operating policy also aects the expected cost for equityholders of the
debt repayment. If they close the rm when the scrap value exceeds the debt obligation,
equityholders fully bear the cost of repaying their debt (the probability of default under
such a scenario is zero). Keeping the rm alive allows them to decrease the cost the debt
repayment as a state of default may occur latter. Compared to the rst best policy which
is only concerned with rm's value maximisation, this eect tilts the optimal decision
towards more continuation. An important implication of this reasoning is that the debt
capacity is less than in the case where the operating policy would be the rst best one.
As the rm's value is higher with the rst best policy while the equity value is higher
with the second best policy and as the sum of the debt and equity value equals the rm's
value, necessarily the debt value is reduced. Hence, that implies that yield spreads are
15
This is easily deduced from Lemma 3.
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higher than what one would obtain when ignoring the agency conict, i.e. assuming a
rst best operating policy.
3.3 Comparative Statics
We now investigate how agency costs vary with leverage, time and the number of possible
scrapping dates.
How does the face value of debt aect the equityholders' incentives to engage in ex-
cessive continuation? We deduce from proposition 2:
Corollary 2 The value of the agency costs associated with a zero coupon debt increases
with the face value of debt, M.
Proof: see appendix.
Comparing the rst and second best operating sets, one observes that they only coincide
when M goes to zero and that the dierence between the two increases with the leverage.
First a higher leverage makes it more likely that the discounted face value of debt exceeds
the scrapping value which leads equityholders to continue independently of the value of
productive assets. But even in the opposite case where the debt can be entirely repaid
if the rm is scrapped do we observe more excessive continuation when M gets larger.
Following the previous intuition according to which continuing is a way to reduce the
expected cost of repaying the debt, a higher leverage makes it even more valuable for
equityholders to continue as this motive is more important. Alternatively, one can say
that equityholders are more prone to take on risks as only substantial upturns are needed
for them to get some returns out of the company when M is larger. Hence, the model
predicts that agency costs and consequently yield spreads to be higher for rms with
higher levels of leverage.
Another question of interest concerns the evolution of agency costs over time. In
particular, it is often argued that risk-taking behaviour is more of a problem when the
rm gets closer to the debt maturity. Equityholders can have a better idea of the likelihood
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that they will be able to repay the debt and, in case the nancial situation looks rather
diÆcult, may be more willing to engage in excessive risk taking. Note that in the case
Æ  r, the answer to the question is very simple: at any date dierent from the last one,
we have seen that the rm's operations are continued in the rst best but this is also
true in the second best as
~
S(t
i
)  0. It is always optimal to wait until the last possible
scrapping date for making a decision. Indeed, there is no cost to keep the option to scrap
the rm alive until this last date
16
. Not scrapping today for possibly scrapping the rm
at the last date can be viewed as an investment which yields an expected return of Æ.
This is better than scrapping now and investing the proceeds in the riskless asset at a
rate r. Whatever the number of scrapping dates, the only one which is relevant is the
last one and so agency costs are fully determined by the deviation of the operating policy
due to debt at this last date. Using optimal stopping representation, one can prove this
property still holds if the scrapping decision can be taken in continuous time. This result
can be seen as the symmetric of the one derived for instance in Dixit and Pindyck (1994)
page 148: under a risk neutrality assumption, if the riskless rate of return is less than
the instantaneous expected return of a project, the rm will be better o waiting and
will never invest. Of course, considering a continuous scrapping decision means that we
are concerned with the valuation of an American type exchange option. Explicit pricing
formula only exist for innite maturity
17
. Carr (1988) proposes to use the methodology
of Geske and Johnson (1984) applied to compound exchange options to approximate the
value of an American type exchange option with nite maturity. We simply note here that
the variational methodology we develop imply potential improvements of this numerical
procedure. If the operating policies coincide at n   1 dates, there is however at the last
date excessive continuation. We can thus conclude that in this somehow degenerated
case, excessive continuation is possibly a problem only when the rm gets very close to
the maturity.
In the case Æ  r, simplifying slightly the model by assuming that the scrap value is
16
The fact that t
n
 T introduces a cost of not scrapping at the last possible date: this option is then
irremediably lost. If t
n
= T , this cost also disappears and whatever the capital structure, the decision
taken at T is eÆcient.
17
see for instance Gerber and Shiu (1996).
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deterministic, we can also show the following corollary of Proposition 2:
Corollary 3 The continuation policy chosen by equityholders of a leveraged company
(continue i !
i
2 E
n i
) departs more and more from the rst best policy (continue i
!
i
2 A
?
n i
) if and only if:
P (
b
V
SB
n i 1
;M; T   t
n i 1
) < P (
b
V
SB
n i
;M; T   t
n i
)
where,
b
V
SB
n i
is implicitly dened for all 0  i  n  1 by the relation:
C
i
(
b
V
SB
n i
+ P (
b
V
SB
n i
;M; T   t
n i
); S(t
n i
); t
n i
) 
e
S(t
n i
)) = 0: (3)
Proof: see appendix
When only the current value is stochastic, both the rst best and the second best
policies reduce to a simple threshold rule: continue at date t
i
whenever the current value
V (t
i
) is high enough. Equation (3) characterizes the threshold of the current value of the
rm's assets beyond which equityholders of a leveraged company choose to continue the
activity of the rm at date t
n i
. The proof of corollary 3 developped in appendix shows
that (i) the threshold chosen by the equityholders of a leveraged company is higher than
the one which would prevail in the absence of debt, (this clearly illustrates the excessive
continuation problem) and that (ii) the dierence between these two thresholds, (that is
the evolution of agency costs), is simply governed by the evolution of the value of a put
option. Remark that since the value of a put is not a monotonic function of its maturity,
the evolution of agency costs is not fully explicit.
The next proposition characterises (in the general case) how the dierence between
the rst best decision rule and the second best one evolves with the number of possible
scrapping dates, n.
Proposition 3
(i) If the riskless interest rate is lower than the instantaneous return of the scrap value
of the rm's assets (r  Æ) then the agency costs of debt are independent of n, the
number of possible scrapping dates.
20
(ii) If the riskless interest rate is higher than the instantaneous return of the scrap value
of the rm's assets (r > Æ) then the agency costs of debt increase with n.
Proof: see appendix.
When Æ  r, we have seen that it is always optimal to wait until the last possible
scrapping date for making a decision. The number of scrapping pending dates is thus
irrelevant. When Æ  r, the second best as well as the rst best may call for an early
closure. We know that the magnitude of the agency costs is given by the dierence
between two compound options:

n
(0) = C
n
(V (0); S(0); 0)  
n
(V (0); S(0); 0;A
1
; A
2
; :::; A
n
): (4)
Adding a new scrapping date induces a new composition of the \initial" compound option-
s. Thus, both term of the dierence (4) decrease when n increases. Our proposition says
that the second term of (4) decreases relatively more than the rst term. The intuition
is simple: adding a new scrapping date does not introduce any new ineÆciency in the
policy of the rst best rm (by denition) while it does so in the second best. Moreover
these additional distortions cannot compensate for each other as they all go in the same
direction, i.e. excessive continuation.
We now investigate some possibilities to reduce these distortions.
4 Limiting Excessive Continuation.
4.1 The Role of Renegotiation.
In presence of ineÆciencies, we may expect rational economic agents to renegotiate con-
tracts in a Pareto improving way. The contract theory literature has indeed emphasized
the importance of renegotiation when predicting the consequences of dierent contractual
arrangements. In a continuous time model with some exogenous bankruptcy costs, the
papers of Leland (1994), Leland and Toft (1996), Anderson and Sundaresan (1996), or
Mella-Barral (1999) have introduced the possibility that following a default, debtholders
and equityholders renegotiate the debt contract to limit these costs. These papers have
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shown how such a possibility creates a scope for strategic default and how it modies for
instance the spread associated with defaultable bonds. However, the existence of signif-
icant direct bankruptcy costs, essential for these results, seems to be challenged by the
empirical evidence which typically concludes to an order of magnitude in the range of
3-5% of the rm value for these costs.
In our model, there is a role for renegotiation even when assuming that direct bankrupt-
cy costs are null. Indeed, renegotiation may occur to eliminate the (endogenous) agency
costs of debt. We start by studying the benchmark case where renegotiation takes place
without friction and at zero cost.
Suppose that at every date, the debtholders can get together and collectively oer
to pay an amount R
t
to the equityholders if they accept to close the rm at the next
scrapping date. The scenario in which they pay the equityholders for continuing is irrele-
vant because the previous section has shown that equityholders never engage in excessive
liquidation
18
. What does the sequence of renegotiation oers look like and are agency
costs fully eliminated?
The minimum R
t
that equityholders will accept has to be such that their payo when
closure occurs plus this extra transfer is equal to their payo under continuation. Deriving
this amount and examining the conditions under which debtholders make such an oer
allows us to show:
Proposition 4
(i) Renegotiation occurs anytime the realisation of S and V are such that the rst best
policy calls for a shut-down while equityholders would continue without renegotiation.
Hence, excessive continuation is eliminated.
(ii) Compared to a world without agency conicts, debt capacity is reduced.
Proof: see appendix
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We also need that debtholders never want too continue more often than equityholders would like
to. One can check that debtholders would choose an operating regime characterised by excessive closure
compared to the rst best.
22
The possibility of costless renegotiation eliminates the ineÆciencies but is not equiv-
alent to a situation where agency conicts would be inexistent. For a given face value of
debt, debtholders have to give up some payos if they want to renegotiate. Hence, the
existence of a potential conict over the operating policy reduces the debt capacity. The
proof in the appendix assumes that debtholders give a transfer R
t
as small as possible. Of
course, if equityholders have the bargaining power they may force debtholders to greater
concessions which would reduce the debt capacity even more. Therefore, the results do
not depend on the respective bargaining powers.
The dynamics of the renegotiation oers are very simple: whenever the value of V and
S are such that the rst best would call for a closure at that date and that equityholders
are better o under continuation, renegotiation takes place. The renegotiation oer always
takes the same form: debtholders propose to stop the activity and accept to pay a transfer
to the equityholders for taking this decision. Therefore, a renegotiation strategy where
debtholders accept some excessive continuation at the beginning, knowing that they will
renegotiate latter on, is dominated. The rst best is restored because renegotiation takes
place under symmetric information: as it is standard in contract theory, the absence of
asymmetric information guarantees that renegotiation reaches a Pareto eÆcient outcome.
As we said, the previous result should be considered as a benchmark, i.e. the outcome
in a world where renegotiation takes place at no cost whenever some ineÆcient decisions
are about to be taken. In practice, these conditions are unlikely to be fullled and one may
ask what sort of mechanisms could help implement this form of renegotiation. Assuming
that debtholders could be able to solve any coordination and free-riding problems when
making oers (i.e. supposing some sort of representative debtholders is delegated the
task to bargain with the equityholders), one practical mechanism would be to promise a
debt discount to equityholders as a reward for early closure. For instance, debtholders
could decrease the face value M to
~
M such that equityholders have a proper incentive to
shut the rm down. Such a solution would require debt concessions which are both time
dependent and conditional on the current state of the world dened by V (t
n i
); S(t
n i
).
This dependence on time and states of the world rules out the possibility to implement
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the rst best by a contract which would specify a schedule of anticipated debt repayments
(equal to what the representative debtholder would oer to equityholders). Moreover,
one cannot design a debt contract which would induce an eÆcient shift of control, i.e.
a transfer of control to the party more likely to take a decision in conformity with the
rst best rule. This is in contrast with the results obtained by Dewatripont and Tirole
(1993) who show that a debt contract can be optimally designed to induce the choice of
an appropriate abandonment decision. The dierence lies in the dynamic and stochastic
structure of the models. The optimal arrangement in one state at one particular date is
typically not optimal at another date. Given the structure of the model, the contract will
have to be ne-tuned to have a chance to implement the rst best. A simple debt contract
fails to achieve that because debt repayments cannot be contingent on the dierence
between the current and the residual value of the rm's assets.
When renegotiation is diÆcult to implement, dierent contractual arrangements can
help trigger it and can reduce ineÆciencies. The design of debt covenants, the time prole
of coupons or the maturity structure are some key elements in that respect. The next
sections will analyse in more detail the last two possibilities but we briey discuss here
the role of covenants.
The ideal covenant would specify that the rm should be closed whenever the rst
best rule calls for a shut down. For instance, at date t
n
, this covenant should say that
the rm is closed if and only if S(t
n
)  V (t
n
). As this example highlights, this sort of
covenant would require that a court of justice be able to verify both the value of V and
S. When the residual value of the assets is diÆcult to determine without closing the
rm, the court may be unable to enforce such covenants. A common class of covenants
species some minimum net worth requirement. In our model, this would imply that
whenever v(t), the value of the rm at date t, is lower than a threshold v, bankruptcy is
triggered. Again, we cannot expect to implement the rst best as such a cut-o rule is not
contingent on the dierence V (t)  S(t). Moreover, once they are in control, debtholders
do not choose an operating rule corresponding to the rst best. The operating decision
which maximises the value of their claim typically exhibits too much conservatism. For
instance, they will immediately shut the rm down when S(t
i
)  Me
 r(T t
i
)
, regardless
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of V (t
i
). Whether or not this type of covenant can increase the rm's value depends on
the relative ineÆciency of the equityholders' operating regime compared to the one that
debtholders would choose.
4.2 The Role of Coupons
So far, we have limited our analysis to the case of a zero coupon. The objective of this
section is to remove this assumption and to analyse the consequences of the existence
of coupons on the agency costs. This is a question which can only be addressed in a
non-stationary model: can debt payments be allocated over time in a way which reduces
agency costs?
For tractability reason, we assume that there are two possible scrapping dates (t
1
and
t
2
) and that a coupon M
1
is paid at a date t
1
+  between t
1
and t
2
(0 <  < t
2
  t
1
).
The rest of the debt M
2
is repaid at date T .
We suppose that to repay the rst coupon, new equity is issued
19
. Bankruptcy is
modelled as in Geske (1977)
20
: whenever new equity cannot be raised to repay the coupon,
the ownership of the company is transfered to debtholders. This implies that they are
now entitled both to the income rights and the control rights. In particular, they are in
charge of the operating decisions at any pending scrapping date.
We consider the case where total indebtedness is held constant, i.e. M
1
e
r(T t
1
 )
+
M
2
= M and we vary M
1
and M
2
. For instance, if M
1
= 0 or M
2
= 0 we are back to a
zero coupon case. We can then show:
Proposition 5
An increase in M
1
while keeping the total indebtedness M
1
e
r(T t
1
 )
+M
2
= M con-
stant, reduces the agency costs and increases the rm's value.
Proof: see appendix.
19
In that case, old and new equityholders are treated in the same way.
20
see also for instance Leland (1994)
25
The introduction of a coupon aects the gamble for resurrection and the agency costs
in a non trivial way. Equityholders take dierent decisions at date t
1
and at date t
2
and both are aected when M
1
increases. Moreover, the probability that debtholders, as
opposed to equityholders, are in control at date t
2
is also modied.
The somehow degenerated case Æ  r is useful for starting to illustrate the intuition
behind this last proposition. In that case, both decision rules, rst and second best, call for
no scrapping at date 1. Consequently, equityholders always take the eÆcient decision at
date t
1
. The only concern is to reduce the agency costs coming from the operating decision
taken at date 2. Whether or not equityholders stay in control does not modify the eect.
Suppose they do: a higher coupon implies a lowerM
2
and from corollary 2, a less distorted
continuation set. If now, bankruptcy is triggered at date t
1
+  , debtholders are fully
residual claimants and continue at date t
2
if and only if it is eÆcient to do so. Notice that
one would like to increase the probability of bankruptcy in this scenario: equityholders,
contrary to debtholders, adopt a suboptimal operating strategy at date t
2
are less likely
to be in charge when M
1
increases. Optimally, the debt should be a zero coupon bond
with a short maturity. In fact, this comes from the fact that bankruptcy reunies the
dierent claims and put them in only one hand. The multiplicity of claimholders is the
root of excessive continuation: like an externality problem, equityholders do not take
into account the consequences of the continuation decision on debtholders' claim value.
Following bankruptcy, this externality is internalised.
The case where Æ  r is more complicated but the previous conclusion is even stronger.
The rst thing to remark is that again the operating policy at date t
2
is closer to the
rst best one when M
1
increases for the same reasons as the one just discussed. More
surprisingly, an increase in M
1
also reduces the departure in the operating policy from
the rst best one at date t
1
. The reason is that an increase in M
1
at total indebtedness
constant reduces the value of equity conditional on continuation at date t
1
. There are
two eects to distinguish: rst, if the operating decision at date t
2
was exogenously given,
paying a coupon decreases the value of equity under continuation at t
1
because it increases
the risk of default at t
1
+ : keepingM constant, increasing the coupon makes it more likely
that the rm will go bankrupt as in Geske (1979). But there is a second eect which is
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that the operating policy at date t
2
will also be modied. As emphasized in the discussion
of Lemma 4, the value of equity at date t
1
is composed not only by the scrap value net
of the debt repayments but also by the exchange option which allows equityholders to
swap at date t
2
, (S(t
2
) M
2
e
 r(T t
2
)
)
+
for C(V (t
2
);M
2
; T   t
2
). The value of this option
increases with M
2
. An increase in M
1
with M constant implies a decrease in M
2
and
hence a reduction of this option value. This eect thus reinforces the eect due to default
risk to reduce even further the value of equity at date t
1
conditionally on not scrapping
at that date. However, the value of equity if scrapping occurs at that date is independent
of the allocation of coupons: the whole debt (with some proper discounting) becomes
due. As a consequence, the introduction of a coupon makes equityholders less willing to
continue at date t
1
. As there is excessive continuation compared to the rst best, this is
a benet of designing a debt contract with a coupon.
This reduction of the gamble incentives at date t
1
is however insuÆcient to fully
eliminate the excessive continuation problem. The reason is still that although the debt
becomes fully due if they stop at date t
1
, equityholders will repay it after having continued
at date t
1
only if the rm's value if high enough. Hence, if they continue they reduce the
expected cost of repaying the debt, which compared with the rst best tilts their decision
toward more continuation.
>From the previous proposition, we deduce the following corollary about the debt
capacity:
Corollary 4 An increase in M
1
while keeping the total indebtednessM
1
e
r(T t
1
 )
+M
2
=
M constant, increases the debt capacity.
For a given operating policy, an increase in M
1
with M constant reduces the value of
equity (more precisely, it reduces the equity value if continuation takes place at t
1
and
leaves it unchanged otherwise). The previous proposition has shown that the rm's value
increases, so for these two reasons the market value of the debt at date 0 is increased.
This result has some implications for the evolution of yields on defaultable bonds. Not
only the payment of coupons modies the default risk but it also aects the \gambling
risk". The reduction in agency costs impact positively on the debt capacity and hence
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reduces the spread with risk-free yields, compared to a model which ignores agency costs.
5 Conclusion
This paper has characterised the agency costs of debt due to excessive continuation by
equityholders in a continuous time environment. As such, it oers a dynamic extension
of so far mainly static models in corporate nance. The paper makes a step toward an
analysis of the magnitude of these costs by deriving a quasi-closed form for agency costs.
At a conceptual level, we have analysed how leverage distorts the operating decisions
taken by equityholders, given that the continuation decision has some option value in the
stochastic environment considered. We have also analysed the evolution of these agency
conicts as time passes. Adopting a non stationary model has allowed us to address
questions like the optimal allocation of coupons over time and to investigate the sequence
of renegotiation oers made in equilibrium. We have shown that the agency costs can
be fully eliminated with renegotiation taking place anytime the second best policy diers
from the rst best although compared to this rst best world, the debt capacity is reduced.
The introduction of coupons also proved to be eective to limit excessive continuation.
Coupons now aect not only the default risk but also the \gambling risk".
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Under risk neutrality, for a given continuation policy A
1
;    ;A
n
, the value,
v
n
(V (0); S(0); 0;A
1
;    ;A
n
), of the rm at date 0 is
v
n
(V (0); S(0); 0;A
1
;    ;A
n
) = IE[e
 rt
1
S(t
1
)(1  1I
A
1
)]
+
n
X
i=2
IE[e
 rt
i
S(t
i
)(1  1I
A
i
)1I
A
1
  1I
A
i 1
]
+IE[e
 rt
n
V (t
n
)1I
A
1
   1I
A
n
]:
This can be re-written under the form
v
n
(V (0); S(0); 0;A
1
;    ;A
n
) = e
 (r Æ)t
1
S
0
+ fIE[e
 rt
n
(V (t
n
)  S(t
n
))1I
A
1
\\A
n
+
n 1
X
i=1
IE[e
 rt
i
~
S(t
i
)1I
A
1
\\A
i
]g:
The proposition is then a direct consequence of lemma 1 and lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 4
(i) is obvious
(ii) is proved by induction on i. For i = 1, under the continuation decision, the value
of the equities at date t
n 1
is
IE
t
n 1
[e
 r(t
n
 t
n 1
)
maxf(S(t
n
) Me
 r(T t
n
)
)
+
; C(V (t
n
);M; T   t
n
)g]
= IE
t
n 1
[e
 r(t
n
 t
n 1
)
maxfS(t
n
) Me
 r(T t
n
)
; C(V (t
n
);M; T   t
n
)g]
= IE
t
n 1
[e
 r(t
n
 t
n 1
)
maxfS(t
n
); V (t
n
) + P (V (t
n
);M; T   t
n
)g] Me
 r(T t
n 1
)
= IE
t
n 1
[e
 r(t
n
 t
n 1
)
maxfV (t
n
) + P (V (t
n
);M; T   t
n
)  S(t
n
); 0g]
+S(t
n 1
)e
 (r Æ)(t
n
 t
n 1
)
 Me
 r(T t
n 1
)
= C
1
(V (t
n 1
) + P (V (t
n 1
);M; T   t
n 1
); S(t
n 1
); t
n 1
) + S(t
n 1
)e
 (r Æ)(t
n
 t
n 1
)
 Me
 r(T t
n 1
)
:
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where the rst equality comes from the positivity of the price of a call option and the
second equality comes from the put-call parity formula.
Using the induction property and similar calculations as in the rst part of the proof,
it is easy to see that the value fo the equities at date t
n i 1
under the continuation policy
veries the equality :
IE
t
n i 1
[e
 r(t
n i
 t
n i 1
)
maxf(S(t
n i
) Me
 r(T t
n i
)
)
+
;
C
i
(V (t
n i
) + P (V (t
n i
);M; T   t
n i
); S(t
n i
); t
n i
)
+e
 (r Æ)(t
n i+1
 t
n i
)
S(t
n i
) Me
 r(T t
n i
)
g]
= C
i+1
(V (t
n i 1
) + P (V (t
n i 1
);M; T   t
n i 1
); S(t
n i 1
); t
n i 1
)
+e
 (r Æ)(t
n i
 t
n i 1
)
S(t
n i 1
) Me
 r(T t
n i 1
)
:
Proof of Proposition 2
For the rst part of the proposition, we just have to prove that
81  i  n  1;
E
n i
= fC
i
(V (t
n i
) + P (V (t
n i
);M; T   t
n i
); S(t
n i
); t
n i
) 
~
S(t
n i
)g:
>From lemma 3 and lemma 4, equityholders decide to continue at date t
n i
(81  i  n 1)
if and only if
C
i
(V (t
n i
) + P (V (t
n i
);M; T   t
n i
); S(t
n i
); t
n i
)
+e
 (r Æ)(t
n i+1
 t
n i
)
S(t
n i
) Me
 r(T t
n i
)
 S(t
n i
) Me
 r(T t
n i
)
;
or equivalently
C
i
(V (t
n i
) + P (V (t
n i
);M; T   t
n i
); S(t
n i
); t
n i
) 
~
S(t
n i
):
The second part of the proposition can be proved by remarking that for all 0  i  n 1
A

n i
 E
n i
, as the value of a put is non negative. The property is obvious for i = 0.
For 1  i  n  1, the inclusion is easily veried by induction on i and by comparing at
each exercise date the payo of the two compound exchange options which dene the sets
A

n i
and E
n i
.
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This ends the proof.
Proof of Corollary 2
Corollary 2 is a consequence of the following lemma
Lemma 5 Let A
i
and A
0
i
two sequences of F
t
i
measurable subsets for i = 1; n. Assume
A

i
 A
i
 A
0
i
then

n
(V (0); S(0); 0;A
1
; :::;A
n
) > 
n
(V (0); S(0); 0;A
0
1
; :::;A
0
n
):
Proof of Lemma 5
By induction on n: For n = 1, since (A
0
1
 A
1
) \ A

1
= ;, we have

1
(V (0); S(0); 0;A
0
1
)  
1
(V (0); S(0); 0;A
1
) = IE[e
 rt
1
(V (t
1
)  S(t
1
))1I
A
0
1
 A
1
] < 0:
Suppose now the lemma true for n  1.

n
(V (0); S(0); 0;A
1
; :::;A
n
) = IE[e
 rt
1
(
n 1
(V (0); S(0); 0;A
2
; :::;A
n
) 
~
S(t
1
))1I
A
1
]
> IE[e
 rt
1
(
n 1
(V (0); S(0); 0;A
0
2
; :::;A
0
n
) 
~
S(t
1
))1I
A
1
]
> IE[e
 rt
1
(
n 1
(V (0); S(0); 0;A
0
2
; :::;A
0
n
) 
~
S(t
1
))1I
A
1
]
+IE[e
 rt
1
(
n 1
(V (0); S(0); 0;A
0
2
; :::;A
0
n
) 
~
S(t
1
))1I
A
0
1
 A
1
]
= IE[e
 rt
1
(
n 1
(V (0); S(0); 0;A
0
2
; :::;A
0
n
) 
~
S(t
1
))1I
A
0
1
]
= 
n
(V (0); S(0); 0;A
0
1
; :::;A
0
n
):
The rst inequality comes from the induction assumption. For the second inequality,
simply remark that A
0
1
 A
1
\ A

1
= ; and thus
(
n 1
(V (0); S(0); 0;A
0
2
; :::;A
0
n
) 
~
S(t
1
))1I
A
0
1
 A
1
< 0 a:s
Corollary 2 is then a direct consequence of assertion (ii) of proposition 2.
Proof of Corollary 3
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Assume the scrap value S being deterministic, using comparative statics results on
compound exchange option
21
we verify that the continuation sets for the rst best rule
and for the second best rule can now be re-written:
A

n i
= fV (t
n i
) 
b
V
FB
n i
g; 80  i  n  1;
E
n i
= fV (t
n i
) 
b
V
SB
n i
g; 80  i  n  1:
where,
b
V
FB
n i
; ( resp.
b
V
SB
n i
) is implicitly dened for all 0  i  n  1 by the relation:
'
FB
i
(
b
V
FB
n i
) = 0;
where '
FB
i
(V ) = C
i
(V; S(t
n i
); t
n i
)  
e
S(t
n i
). ( resp. '
SB
i
(
b
V
SB
n i
) = 0; where
'
SB
i
(V ) = C
i
(V + P (V;M; T   t
n i
); S(t
n i
); t
n i
) 
e
S(t
n i
)).
With Æ < r, we have:
0 <
b
V
SB
n i
<
b
V
FB
n i
80  i  n  1:
We want to prove
b
V
FB
n i 1
 
b
V
SB
n i 1
<
b
V
FB
n i
 
b
V
SB
n i
, P (
b
V
SB
n i 1
;M; T   t
n i 1
) < P (
b
V
SB
n i
;M; T   t
n i
):
Using again monotonicity properties of the functions '
FB
i
and '
SB
i
:
b
V
FB
n i 1
 
b
V
SB
n i 1
<
b
V
FB
n i
 
b
V
SB
n i
, '
FB
i
(
b
V
FB
n i 1
 
b
V
SB
n i 1
+
b
V
SB
n i
) < 0
,
b
V
FB
n i 1
 
b
V
SB
n i 1
< P (
b
V
SB
n i
;M; T   t
n i
)
,
b
V
FB
n i 1
<
b
V
SB
n i 1
+ P (
b
V
SB
n i
;M; T   t
n i
)
, '
FB
i+1
(
b
V
SB
n i 1
+ P (
b
V
SB
n i
;M; T   t
n i
)) > 0
, P (
b
V
SB
n i 1
;M; T   t
n i 1
) < P (
b
V
SB
n i
;M; T   t
n i
):
The second equivalence comes from the relation
C
i
(
b
V
FB
n i 1
 
b
V
SB
n i 1
+
b
V
SB
n i
; S(t
n i
); t
n i
) <
~
S(t
n i
) = C
i
(V
SB
n i
+P (
b
V
SB
n i
;M; T t
n i
); S(t
n i
); t
n i
):
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Throughout this proof we use the increasness of the price of a compound exchange option
C
n
(X(t); S(t); t) with respect to the underlying price X(t). Carr (1988) rst proves this result for a
composition of two exchange options. A calculus based on our lemma 2 and on the envelop theorem
allows us to generalize the Carr's result to the case of a composition of n exchange options.
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The last equivalence comes from the relation
'
FB
i+1
(
b
V
SB
n i 1
+ P (
b
V
SB
n i 1
;M; T   t
n i 1
)) = '
SB
i+1
(
b
V
SB
n i 1
) = 0:
Proof of Proposition 3
(i) Simply remark that, from propositions 1 and 2, if r  Æ then A

n i
= E
n i
= 
 for all
1  i  n  1.
(ii) From lemma 1, corollary 1, propositions 1 and 2, we have

n
(0) =  IE[e
 rt
n
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n
)  S(t
n
))1I
fE
1
\:::\E
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\:::\A
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)1I
fE
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\:::\A

i
g
]:
We want to prove 
n
(0)  
n 1
(0)  0.
Remark that
(i) (E
1
\ : : :\ E
n
)  (A

1
\ : : :\A

n
) = 
1
\ : : :\
n
where 
i
def
= E
i
 A

i
81  i  n.
(ii) 1I

1
\:::\
i
  1I

2
\:::\
i
=  1 8 2  i  n.
We deduce
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n
))(1I

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
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Now, let us introduce the measure Q
V
(resp. Q
S
) dened by its Radon-Nikodym
derivative with respect to the measure Q:
dQ
V
dQ
=
V (T )
IE
Q
(V (T )]
;
(resp.
dQ
S
dQ
=
S(T )
IE
Q
(S(T )]
):
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A direct computation yields then :
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To obtain the result, simply remark that:
(i) 1I

2
\:::\
i
 
1
  1I

2
\:::
i+1
 
1
 0 a:s 8 2  i  n   1
(ii) e
 (r Æ)t
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 (r Æ)t
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Proof of Proposition 4
Proof of part (i)
By backward induction on the scrapping dates t
n i
we prove, for i = 0; n   1, that
renegotiation occurs at date t
n i
i the rst best rule is not respected i.e:
C
i
(V (t
n i
); S(t
n i
); t
n i
) 
e
S(t
n i
):
The proof is non technical and for seek of concision we only give the detail of the argu-
mentation for the renegotiation game at date t
n i 1
.
Thus, let us assume date t
n i 1
is reached. When deciding whether or not they should
make a renegotiation oer, debtholders take into consideration the possibility that rene-
gotiation could occur at date t
n i
, and so do equityholders when deciding upon accepting
an oer. Three events may happens at date t
n i
:
A
n i
= f equityholders decide to stop the rm at date date t
n i
without renegotiation g,
B
n i
= f equityholders decide to stop the rm at date date t
n i
following a
renegotiation g,
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Cn i
= f equityholders decide to continue the activity of the rm at date date t
n i
without
renegotiation g.
More formally, using the induction assumption:
A
n i
= fC
i
(V (t
n i
) + P (V (t
n i
);M; T   t
n i
); S(t
n i
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n i
) 
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)g;
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);M; T   t
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) 
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)
and C
i
(V (t
n i
); S(t
n i
); t
n i
) 
e
S(t
n i
)g;
C
n i
= fC
i
(V (t
n i
); S(t
n i
); t
n i
) 
e
S(t
n i
)g:
Suppose debtholders oer R
n i 1
to the equityholders against immediate closure. Eq-
uityholders and debtholders compare their payo under renegotiation and their payo
without renegotiation. Using lemma 4, a direct analysis shows that equityholders will
accept the oer i:
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:
The best oer from the point of vue of the debtholders is of course the lowest R
n i 1

R
n i 1
satisfying this equation. That is:
R
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Debtholders compare their payo under renegotiation and their payo without renegoti-
ation. We deduce thus renegotiation happens i:
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Rearranging the terms of this last equation yields debtholders will renegotiate in the way
describe above if and only if:
S(t
n i 1
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Proof of part ii)
We have to compare the expected payo of the debtholders with what they would
get in the absence of any agency conict. In both cases, the operating policy is given by
the rst best rule, as shown in part (i). But, to induce the equityholders to choose the
eÆcient decision, debtholders have to pay R
n i 1
when renegotiation occurs. Assume for
instance, at date t
n i
the event
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occurs
22
then the value of the debt at date t
n i
in presence of agency conicts and interim
renegotiation is
S(t
n i
)  C
i
(V (t
n i
) + P (V (t
n i
;M; T   t
n i
); S(t
n i
); t
n i
)
 e
 (r Æ)(t
n i+1
 t
n i
)
S(t
n i
) +Me
 r(t
n
 t
n i
)
:
In a world without agency conicts, where a benevolent party would choose the operating
decision maximizing the total value of the claims, the payo of a zero coupon if the same
event occurs would be minfS(t
n i
);Me
 r(T t
n i
)
g. Using our lemma 3 and the put call
parity formula it is easy to see that
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We can check in all other state of natures at date t
n i
, the expected payos of the
debtholders are the same in both cases (the conict case and the one with agency conicts
and interim renegotiation). Same arguments apply for other dates. This ends the proof.
22
This event is exactly the event \ equityholders want to continue and this decision is ineÆcient."
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We now turn to the derivation of the continuation set E
0
1
. Using risk neutral valuation
we obtain:
E
0
1
= fIE
t
1
[e
 r
(IE
t
1
+
[e
 r(T t
1
 )
(V (T ) M
2
)
+
1I
E
0
2
+ e
 r(t
2
 t
1
 )
(S(t
2
) M
2
e
 r(T t
2
)
)
+
(1  1I
E
0
2
)]  M
1
)1I
B
]
 S(t
1
) Me
 r(T t
1
)
g:
E
0
1
= fIE
t
1
[e
 r
(IE
t
1
+
[e
 r(t
2
 t
1
 )
(C(V (t
2
);M
2
; T   t
2
)  S(t
2
) +M
2
e
 r(T t
2
)
)1I
E
0
2
]
 M
1
  M
2
e
 r(T t
1
 )
+ S(t
2
)e
 r(t
2
 t
1
 )
)1I
B
]  S(t
1
) Me
 r(T t
1
)
g:
E
0
1
= fIE
t
1
[e
 r
(IE
t
1
+
[e
 r(t
2
 t
1
 )
(P (V (t
2
);M
2
; T   t
2
) + V (t
2
)  S(t
2
))1I
E
0
2
]
 Me
 r(T t
1
 )
+ S(t
2
)e
 r(t
2
 t
1
 )
)1I
B
]  S(t
1
) Me
 r(T t
1
)
g:
E
0
1
= fIE
t
1
[e
 r
(C(V (t
1
+ ) + P (V (t
1
+ );M
2
; T   t
1
  ); S(t
1
+ ); t
2
  t
1
  )
 Me
 r(T t
1
 )
+ S(t
2
)e
 r(t
2
 t
1
 )
)
+
]  S(t
1
) Me
 r(T t
1
)
g:
where
C(V (t
1
+ ) + P (V (t
1
+ );M
2
; T   t
1
  ); S(t
1
+ ); t
2
  t
1
  )
denotes the price at date t
1
+  of the option to exchange at date t
2
, S(t
2
) for V (t
2
) +
P (V (t
2
);M
2
; T   t
2
).
Now remark that, as the total indebtnessM is held constant, the event E
0
1
only depends
on M
1
2 [0;Me
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e
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. Comparative
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statics results give then the decreasness of the continuation decision set E
0
1
in M
1
. More-
over, for M
1
= 0, one gets from lemma 3 and the put-call parity formula:
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On the other hand, forM
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To see this last inclusion remark that:
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Assertion (ii) is thus proved.
Following the notations of proposition 2, let dene w
2
(V (0); S(0); 0; E
0
1
; E
0
2
;B), the rm
value at date 0 associated to the capital structure described in section 4.2. Let us denote
by B
c
the event \the rm is in bankruptcy at date t
1
+ ". A direct calculus shows
Lemma 7 The following holds
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(ii) Let consider two sets B and B in F
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satisfying B  B then:
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We are now in a position to conclude the proof of proposition 5: Let M
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Where the rst inequality comes from part (ii) of lemma 7. Part (i) of lemma 7 gives
the equality. For the last inequality, simply remark that the relations E
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and that, from lemma 5, the dierence
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is also positive. The proof of proposition 5 is complete.
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